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AERIAL PEST ERADICATION IN MASSACHUSETTS 
AND CALIFORNIA AND THE PESTICIDE 
MALATHION 
Sean A. Murphy* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
On August 27, 28, and 29, 1990, Massachusetts officials initiated 
an aerial spraying program to apply the pesticide malathion over 700 
thousand acres of the commonwealth's southeastern coast. 1 During 
the three-day period, pilots flying DC-3 aircrafts sprayed both public 
and private property with 14 thousand pounds of the toxic pesticide. 2 
The aim of this massive spraying program was to reduce the threat 
to Massachusetts residents of an. outbreak of eastern equine enceph-
alitis (EEE), a rare but often fatal virus that attacks the brain and 
spinal cord when transmitted to humans. 3 Although the EEE virus 
usually is confined to birds and non-human-biting mosquitos, certain 
types of mosquitos occasionally spread the virus to horses and peo-
ple.4 
• Topics Editor, 1991-1992, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW 
REVIEW. 
1 Priscilla Chapman, Malathion/rom the Skies, NEW ENGLAND SIERRAN, Oct. 1990, at 9, 
col. 1. 
2 Id. 
S Memorandum from John DeVilJars, Secretary, Executive Office of Environmental Affairs 
(EOEA) to Michael Dukakis, Governor of Massachusetts 1 (Aug. 15, 1990) (proposed plan of 
action on EEE) (on file with author). The following month, a 75-year old Massachusetts man 
died as a result of the EEE virus. Jordana Hart, Man, 75, With Virus Dies; Boy Is Released, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 16, 1990, § Metro/Region, at 30. 
• Memorandum from John DeVilJars, supra note 3, at 1. The Massachusetts Department 
of Public Health (DPH) gauges the likelihood of an EEE outbreak by reviewing three factors: 
positive tests for the EEE virus in the mosquito species Culiseta melanura, prevalence of 
Culiseta melanura, and heavy rainfall. Id. at 1-2. The DPH found all three factors to be at 
significantly above average levels during the summer of 1990. Letter from Van Dunn, Deputy 
Commissioner, DPH to Ken Schwartz, Assistant Secretary, Executive Office of Human Ser-
vices (EOHS) 2 (appraisal of public health emergency due to risk of EEE) (on file with author). 
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Although the aerial application of malathion was largely successful 
in reducing the number of mosquitos in southeastern Massachusetts, 
many unintended side-effects also resulted from the spraying pro-
gram. Area hospitals treated at least nine people as a result of 
malathion exposure,5 and as many as one million fish may have died 
as a result of malathion poisoning. 6 Further, although it is difficult 
to count the number of nontargeted organisms killed accidentally as 
a result of the spraying program, tests have proven that malathion 
is extremely toxic to the natural predators of mosquitos. 7 
In 1990, the state of California similarly resorted to repeated 
applications of malathion from helicopters over portions of southern 
California to combat the threat that the Mediterranean fruit fly, or 
"medfly", posed to crops.8 Responding to what the state claimed to 
be a $200-million threat to the agricultural industry within its bor-
ders,9 state officials conducted an aggressive campaign that involved 
a workforce of 487 workers, 47 thousand gallons of malathion, and a 
price tag of about $36 million to eradicate the medfly. 10 
California officials claimed victory over the medfly at the end of 
the year,l1 but some of the opponents to the spraying claimed that 
total eradication of the medfly from southern California was impos-
sible. 12 Opponents pointed to the fact that similar malathion spraying 
programs designed to "eradicate" the medfly had occurred in south-
ern California in 1980, 1981, 1982, 1987, 1988, and 1989.13 Addition-
ally, southern California communities and residents grew increas-
5 Laura Brown & Nick Tate, Spraying Illness Reported, BOSTON HERALD, Aug. 30, 1990, 
at 9, col. 1. 
6 James L. Franklin, Tests Reported to Show Malathion Fish Kills, BOSTON GLOBE, Sept. 
8, 1990, at 49. John Healey, town administrator and health officer in Middleborough, Massa-
chusetts, one of the communities in the spray area, reported that the spraying over the 
estuary of the Agawam River caused one million killifish-minnows that eat mosquito larvae--
to perish. I d. 
7 Chapman, supra note 1, at 9; see also U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY 
(EPA), PESTICIDE FACT SHEET No. 152, at 4 (Mar. 1988) [hereinafter PESTICIDE FACT 
SHEET]. EPA data shows that malathion is "potentially highly toxic to aquatic invertebrates, 
bees, and aquatic life stages of amphibians; moderately toxic to birds; and slightly toxic to 
fish." PESTICIDE FACT SHEET, supra, at 4. 
8 Maura Dolan, Scientists Grow Skeptical About Eradicating Medfly, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 11, 
1990, at AI, col. 5. 
9 See Talevich v. Voss, 734 F. Supp. 425, 428 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
10 See Ashley Dunn, Officials Wary as Spraying Ends, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1990, at A3, 
col. 1, A39, col. 1. . 
11 Ashley Dunn, Victory Declared Against Medflies, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 9, 1990, at Bl, col. 
2, B4, col. 1. 
12 Dolan, supra note 8, at AI. 
13 Id. at A22, col. 1. 
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ingly concerned during the course of the 1990 eradication campaign 
about the wisdom of the aerial sprayings.14 In fact, public irritation 
with the continued helicopter sprayings became so great that one 
community in southern California, Pasadena, passed an ordinance 
banning low-flying aircraft, such as the state's spray helicopters, 
from flying in its airspace. 15 
While Massachusetts's and California's spraying programs had 
different motivations, officials in both states failed adequately to 
consider the long-term effects on human health and the environment 
that would result from wide-scale aerial spraying of malathion. More-
over, despite the existence of environmental statutes in both 
California16 and Massachusetts17 requiring state officials to prepare 
environmental impact analyses of the long-term effects of state ac-
tions, the two states circumvented these statutes in favor of imme-
diate aerial spraying prior to any such environmental analysis. Cit-
izens in both California18 and Massachusetts19 have attempted to use 
the judicial system to halt such spraying in recent years, but state 
courts have failed to find a violation of any constitutionally cognizable 
interest. 20 
Because it is unlikely that the state courts in California and Mas-
sachusetts will find a violation of a constitutional interest to prevent 
future spraying programs, state legislatures should amend state law 
to ensure that states adequately consider the long-term effects of 
their actions on human health and the environment. Such amend-
ments should include both provisions for greater coordination among 
state agencies in addressing public health and agricultural threats 
and greater public participation in the process of addressing such 
14 Ashley Dunn, Malathion Foes Begin to Swarm, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 27, 1990, at AI, col. 
1. A number of protest groups formed to stop the spraying, including Safe Alternatives to 
Fruit Fly Eradication (SAFE); Citizens Against Urban Spraying (CAUS); Residents Against 
Spraying Pesticide (RASP); Coalition Against Malathion; and Garden Grove Residents Against 
Malathion Spraying (GGRAMS). Id. at A30, col. 1. 
15 Ashley Dunn & Vicki Torres, Malathion Dogfo.Jht Ends with Scarcely a Whimper, L.A. 
TIMES, Feb. 23, 1990, at AI, col. 5. As a result of the ordinance's passage, one of Pasadena's 
police helicopters actually attempted to ward off six of the helicopters that the state had hired 
to spray malathion. Id. 
16 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE §§ 21000-21194 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
17 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (1979 & Supp. 1990). 
18 See Talevich v. Voss, 734 F. Supp. 425, 427 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
19 See Dubois v. Johnston, No. 9O-1736A (Plymouth Superior Ct. Mass. filed Aug. 24, 1990). 
"" See Talevich, 734 F. Supp. at 433-34. In an unpublished oral decision, the Massachusetts 
Superior Court in Dubois denied the plaintiffs' motion for an injunction to prevent the spray-
ing. See James L. Franklin, Encephalitis Case Confirmed; Judge Refuses to Halt Spraying, 
BOSTON GLOBE, Aug. 28, 1990, § Metro/Region, at 1, col. 1. 
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threats, and requirements that public officials adhere to existing 
environmental statutes mandating the analysis of long-term effects 
of state action on human health and the environment. 
Section II of this Comment discusses malathion's possible effects 
on human health and the environment. It also examines the federal 
statutes that govern the use of pesticides. Section III then discusses 
Massachusetts's statutory scheme governing pest eradication and 
the measures that the commonwealth has taken to combat mosquito 
populations. In section IV, this Comment describes both California's 
statutory scheme governing pest eradication and its pest eradication 
efforts to date. Section V examines past judicial challenges to pest 
control programs in California and the standard of judicial review 
that California courts have applied. Section VI discusses the possi-
bility of stricter judicial review in future judicial challenges. Finally, 
Sections VII and VIII propose and analyze alternatives to the cur-
rent programs in Massachusetts and California. 
II. MALATHION AND FEDERAL PESTICIDE LAW 
A. Malathion's Effects on Humans and Wildlife 
State officials in both Massachusetts21 and California22 chose mal-
athion for their spraying programs because they considered mala-
thion's impact on humans and the environment to be less damaging 
than other pesticides. Malathion is a "cholinesterase inhibitor", 
meaning that it kills pests by inhibiting an enzyme that is vital to 
nerve impulses.23 Although in 1980 California released a health study 
that concluded malathion does not pose a significant risk to humans, 
Marc Lappe, the study's chief author, later withdrew his support for 
21 Memorandum from Van Dunn, Deputy Commissioner, DPH to Ken Schwartz, Assistant 
Secretary, EOHS 1-2 (Aug. 15, 1990) (human carcinogenicity of malathion) (on file with 
author). 
22 See, e.g., Dunn, supra note 14, at A30, col. 1. In fact, in 1981, B. T. Collins, then director 
of the California Conservation Corps, drank a glass of diluted malathion in an effort to show 
the public that malathion was harmless. [d. 
23 See PESTICIDE FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 3. Because the body lacks active cholines-
terase, the neurotransmitter chemical-which tells muscle cells to contract-remains in the 
body and causes insects to become paralyzed and die. Linda Roach Monroe & Ashley Dunn, 
El Cajon Braces for Threat from the Partly Known, L.A. TIMES, May 21, 1990, at Bl, col. 
2. 
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the study because state officials altered his findings.24 Lappe now 
cautions that direct exposure to malathion poses a significant danger 
of chronic toxicity and possible genetic damage to people who are 
young, old, or infirmed. 25 He claims that although scientists are 
uncertain about malathion's long-term effect on human health or 
behavior, studies of long-term exposure to the pesticide in animals 
show changes in the chromosomal make-up of the blood, bone ma-
terial, and brain. 26 Lappe also states that studies show malathion 
acting as a mutagen, damaging the genetic make-up of germ cells 
such as sperm. 27 
In addition to evidence that malathion may be a mutagen, there 
is an ongoing debate over whether malathion is a carcinogen. 28 After 
reviewing the scientific literature on the effects of malathion, cancer 
researcher Melvin Reuber reported in 1984 that cancerous growths 
on the endocrine organs, brain, and liver, as well as ulcers, chronic 
renal disease and atrophy of the testes in had been found in labo-
ratory rats.29 In 1990, however, the United States Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) stated that there is no "clear-cut" evidence 
of carcinogenicity associated with malathion. 30 While the EPA did 
not classify malathion as a carcinogen, it qualified its assessment by 
stating that it needed more data to make a definitive determination. 31 
Additionally, the agency decided to classify malathion as a noncar-
24 Susan Seager, Sclwlar Disavows State's Use of His Malathion Study, L.A. DAILY J., 
Feb. 5, 1990, at 1, col. 2. Lappe refused to sign the final 1980 report, which the state had 
commissioned, because it changed his findings on the cancer risk of malathion as well as certain 
other findings. [d. 
25 [d. 
26 [d. Additionally, in May 1990, a panel of health experts whom California hired to review 
scientific information on malathion reported that early evidence suggests malathion causes 
genetic damage in laboratory cell cultures, animals, and humans. Monroe & Dunn, supra note 
23, at Bl, col. 2. 
'l:1 Seager, supra note 24, at 1, col. 2. 
28 See, e.g., James Quinn, State Panel Says Malathion No Serious Health Threat, L.A. 
TIMES, Aug. 16, 1990, at AI, col. 5, A32, col. 2. 
29 Peter Green, Commentary; Malathion Options Need Be Found, L.A. TIMES, Jan. 28, 
1990, at BI0, col. 3. Reuber also reported that, "in tests taken to date, it has been demon-
strated that virtually every chemical which has been found to be carcinogenic in humans is 
also carcinogenic in one or more mammalian test animals." [d. 
30 "No Clear-Cut Evidence of Carcinogenicity" for Malathion, EPA Says, PESTICIDE & 
TOXIC CHEM. NEWS, Feb. 14, 1990, at 32. 
31 [d. The EPA fact sheet on malathion concludes that only three of five cancer studies 
using rats and mice are scientifically sufficient as showing no· evidence of carcinogenicity. 
PESTICIDE FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 4. The fact sheet also concludes that studies of birth 
defects in rodents were largely unacceptable. [d. 
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cinogen despite the fact that an EPA peer review group presented 
strong minority recommendations that malathion be classified as a 
"possible" carcinogen. 32 
Since its introduction to the United States pesticide market, mal-
athion has been linked with numerous human poisonings.33 For in-
stance, the EPA's pesticide incident monitoring system reported 962 
incidents of human poisoning from malathion between 1960 and 
1980.34 In California, where reports of occupational pesticide poison-
ings are mandatory, malathion was the third most common cause of 
pesticide illness between 1981 and 1985.35 
Although malathion is considered an effective agent in controlling 
the targeted medflies in California and mosquitos in Massachusetts, 
it also has a strong and debilitating effect on nontargeted species of 
wildlife. 36 In California, home gardeners in spray areas have com-
plained that since the state initiated its spraying program, increasing 
numbers of parasitic insects such as aphids have devoured outdoor 
plants.37 Aphids' natural predators-ladybugs, lacewings, and tiny 
wasps-no longer can keep the aphid population in check because 
malathion poisoning has killed them off in large numbers.38 Studies 
confirm the complaints from California gardeners that malathion is 
poisonous to "good bugs": bugs that prey on insects such as aphids.39 
Moreover, studies by the Office of Endangered Species (OES) in the 
United States Fish and Wildlife Service indicate that certain uses of 
malathion may jeopardize the continued existence of endangered 
species or critical habitat of certain endangered species. 40 
32 "No Clear-Cut Evidence of Carcinogenicity" for Malathion, EPA Says, supra note 30, 
at 32. 
33 NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST THE MISUSE OF PESTICIDES, HEALTH CONCERNS RE-
GARDING MALATHION SPRAYING IN SOUTHERN CALIFORNIA 1 (1988). 
34 [d. (citing OFFICE OF PESTICIDE PROGRAMS, U.S. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION 
AGENCY, SUMMARY OF REPORTED PESTICIDE INCIDENTS INVOLVING MALATHION (1980». 
35 NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST THE MISUSE OF PESTICIDES, supra note 33, at 1. 
36 See PESTICIDE FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 4. 
37 The Spring of Discontent, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1990, at M6, col. 1. 
38 [d. Aphids survive the spraying because unlike their predators, which are active airborne 
travelers, aphids live beneath plant leaves and thus are less likely to come in contact with 
malathion droplets. Stephanie Chavez & Berkeley Hudson, Aphids Attack Gardeners in Wake 
of Medfly Spraying, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 19, 1990, at AI, col. 1, A30, col. 1. 
39 The Spring of Discontent, supra note 37, at M6, col. 1; see also PESTICIDE FACT SHEET, 
supra note 7, at 4. 
40 PESTICIDE FACT SHEET, supra note 7, at 8. As a result of the OES findings, California 
was forced to halt its spraying activities in one area when it learned that the area was the 
habitat of an endangered species of rat. Eric Lichtblau, Rat's Territory Exempted from 
Spraying, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 27, 1990, at A37, col. 1. The federal Endangered Species Act 
requires all federal agencies to ensure that any action authorized, funded, or carried out by 
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B. The Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act 
The federal statute regulating pesticides is the Federal Insecti-
cide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA).41 FIFRA establishes 
labeling and registration requirements for pesticides used in inter-
state commerce and makes it a crime to use a registered pesticide 
in a manner inconsistent with the pesticide's labeling instructions. 42 
The FIFRA registration process includes submittal to the EPA of 
the pesticide's formula, a proposed label, and a full description of 
the tests and results upon which the pesticide manufacturer's claims 
are based.43 Essentially, FIFRA requires the EPA to approve a 
pesticide's registration if the pesticide does not have "any unreason-
able adverse effects on the environment. "44 FIFRA mandates that 
the EPA take into account the economic, social, and environmental 
costs and benefits of the use of a pesticide when the agency deter-
mines whether that pesticide will have an unreasonable adverse 
effect on the environment. 45 
While FIFRA makes it a crime to use a registered pesticide in a 
manner inconsistent with the pesticide's labeling instructions, the 
primary focus of FIFRA is to keep harmful pesticides off the market 
rather than to regulate the manner in which people use them. 46 
FIFRA allows the EPA to enter into cooperative agreements with 
individual states when states show that they are capable of enforcing 
the statute.47 Once the agency reaches such an agreement with a 
state, the individual state, and not the EPA, has the primary au-
thority to take enforcement actions against FIFRA violators.48 Be-
cause both California49 and Massachusetts50 have entered into coop-
an agency will not be likely to jeopardize the continued existence of a listed species or to 
result in the destruction or adverse modification of the critical habitat of a listed species. 16 
u.S.C. §§ 1531-1544 (1988). 
41 7 U.S.C. §§ 136-136y (1988). 
42 [d. §§ 136a(a), 136a(c)(1)(D), 136j(a)(2)(G), 136l. For example, such labeling instructions 
include the recommended concentration of the pesticide, the method of application, and the 
type of terrain on which the pesticide is to be used. [d. § 136(ee). 
43 [d. § 136a(c)(1) . 
.. [d. § 136a(c)(5). 
45 [d. § 136(bb). 
46 See Jeffrey D. Huffaker, The Regulation of Pesticide Use in California, 11 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 273, 280 (1978). 
47 7 U.S.C. § 136u(a) (1988). Once a state submits an acceptable regulatory plan to the 
EPA, the individual state and the EPA may enter into a cooperative agreement whereby the 
individual state will implement the registration and labeling requirements of FIFRA. [d. 
46 [d. § 136w-l (1988). 
49 See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 5001-8808 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
60 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 132B, §§ 1-15 (Supp. 1990). 
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erative agreements with the EPA to enforce FIFRA, a malathion 
applicator in either California or Massachusetts who violates mala-
thion's labeling instructions is subject to state agency enforcement 
actions but not EPA enforcement actions. 51 
III. MASSACHUSETTS'S STATUTORY SCHEME AND PEST 
ERADICATION EFFORTS 
A. Massachusetts Statutes Governing Pest Eradication 
Massachusetts divides the responsibility for recognizing and ad-
dressing public health threats posed by mosquitos between the De-
partment of Public Health (DPH)52 and the State Reclamation and 
Mosquito Control Board (SRMCB), an agency that is composed of 
51 7 U.S.C. § 136w-1 (1988). Moreover, FIFRA does not have a citizen suit provision that 
would allow citizens to trigger an enforcement action under FIFRA. See id. §§ 136-136y. 
Although plaintiffs in California and Massachusetts failed to allege violations of other federal 
statutes, it is possible that the states' malathion spraying programs may have violated the 
Clean Water Act (CWA). See 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (1988). The CWA employs two types of 
effluent limitations: water quality-based, id. § 1313, and technology-based, id. § 1311. The 
first type of limitation is based on the effect of a discharge on water quality and the second 
is based on the technological and economic feasibility of a particular effluent control system. 
[d. §§ 1311-1317. The application of the two standards is such that there are uniform national 
technology-based effluent limitations, but where these limitations are inadequate, the act 
imposes stricter water quality-based limitations. [d. §§ 1312-1313. 
The CWA defines pollution as the "man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, 
physical, biological, and radiological integrity of water." [d. § 1362(19). In order to restore 
and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the nation's waters, the CWA 
declares that "it is the national goal that the discharge of pollutants into the navigable waters 
be eliminated by 1985." [d. § 1251(a)(1). 
Toward that end, Congress established in the CWA the National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES), which requires permits for discharges of pollutants into the 
nation's waters. [d. § 1342. Under the NPDES program, it is unlawful for any person to 
discharge a pollutant without obtaining a permit and complying with its terms. [d. § 1311. 
The CWA defines "discharge of a pollutant" as "any addition of any pollutant to navigable 
waters from any point source." [d. § 1362(12). Courts have interpreted the term "navigable 
waters" to include nonnavigable tributaries that flow into navigable rivers, United States v. 
Ashland Oil and Transp. Co., 504 F.2d 1317,1325 (6th Cir. 1974), and mosquito canals, United 
States v. Holland, 373 F. Supp. 665, 673 (M.D. Fla. 1974). Courts have also interpreted the 
term "point source" broadly to include equipment and machinery such as dump trucks and 
trailer trucks. See, e.g., United States v. Tull, 615 F. Supp. 610, 615-18 (E.D. Va. 1983), 
aff'd, 769 F.2d 182 (4th Cir. 1985), rev'd on other grounds, 481 U.S. 412 (1987). Given the 
court's broad definition of "point source," it is likely that the airplanes involved in the malathion 
operation qualify as point sources. Additionally, given the court's broad definition of "navigable 
waters," it is also likely that a significant portion of the Massachusetts spray area would 
qualify as navigable waters. Thus, the Massachusetts program, which occurred without a 
NPDES permit, arguably violated the CWA. 
52 JOHN D. EDMAN & J. MARSHALL CLARK, GENERIC ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT REPORT 
ON MOSQUITO CONTROL PRACTICES IN MASSACHUSETrS 37-,'38 (1987) (discussion draft), 
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representatives from the Department of Food and Agriculture 
(DF A), the Department of Environmental Protection (DEP), and 
the Department of Environmental Management (DEM).53 Although 
the DPH maintains a summer mosquito surveillance program for the 
EEE virus in eastern Massachusetts, it is the responsibility of the 
SRMCB to orchestrate strategies to eliminate the threat that EEE-
carrying mosquitos pose. 54 A provision of the Massachusetts General 
Laws entitled "Improvement of Low Land" has granted the SRMCB 
the authority to control mosquito populations. 55 Additionally, the 
Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act (MAPA) authorizes 
the SRMCB to promulgate emergency regulations that govern the 
manner in which the SRMCB acts in emergency situations. 56 
Two state statutes potentially constrain the SRMCB as it carries 
out its responsibilities. The Massachusetts Pesticide Control Act 
(MPCA)57 requires notice before sprayers conduct pesticide opera-
tions,58 and the Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act (MEP A)59 
requires preparation of an environmental impact analysis prior to 
the undertaking of any state action that may have an adverse effect 
on the environment. 60 
1. Improvement of Low Land 
The primary statutory authority empowering the SRMCB to con-
trol mosquitos is the Massachusetts General Laws provision entitled 
"Improvement of Low Land. "61 This provision grants the SRMCB 
the power to eradicate mosquitos in any infested area if such erad-
53 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 252, § 2 (1988 & Supp. 1990). The SRMCB is composed of represen-
tatives from the different departments within the EOEA. [d. The DEP formerly was called 
the Department of Environmental Quality Engineering. 
54 See Memorandum from Philip Johnston, Secretary, EOHS, to John DeVillars, Secretary, 
EOEA 1 (Aug. 15, 1990) (on file with author). In his memo, Johnston urged DeVillars to take 
action against the mosquito threat and stated that, while DPH monitors the risk of disease 
posed by EEE, the legal responsibility for addressing mosquito control is within the EOEA. 
[d. 
66 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 252, §§ 1-14C (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
66 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 30A, §§ 1-17 (1979 & Supp. 1990). 
67 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 132B, §§ 1-15 (Supp. 1990). 
68 [d. § 11; MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 333, § 10.03(21} (1987). 
69 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (1979 & Supp. 1990). 
60 Though it would seem likely that an additional constraint on SRMCB abatement activities 
would be the Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act-which controls the use of freshwater 
and coastal wetlands through a public review and decisionmaking process that regulates 
activities affecting wetlands--state-sponsored mosquito control activities are specifically ex-
empt from the provisions of this act. MAss. GEN. L.ch. 131, § 40 (1974). 
61 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 252, §§ 1-14C (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
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ication is "necessary or useful. "62 Significantly, however, in providing 
that the SRMCB or a public health official may "take action" to abate 
a nuisance, the SRMCB enabling statute does not provide for aerial 
application of pesticides over broad, populated areas. 63 
In order to exercise its authority to eradicate mosquitos, the 
SRMCB has two options. It may act pursuant to a determination 
that either it or a public health official makes stating that a mosquito 
breeding area poses a public health threat. 64 Alternatively, it may 
act pursuant to proceedings for low land improvements that will 
promote the "public health, safety, or convenience."65 
If the SRMCB acts pursuant to a determination that mosquitos 
pose a public health threat, it must adhere to the following proce-
dure, which the SRMCB enabling statute sets out. First, the com-
missioner of the local mosquito control district--or, in an area where 
the state has not formed a mosquito control district, the board of 
health-must determine that the particular area is infested by, or is 
likely to produce, mosquitos and is thus a public nuisance. 66 If the 
SRMCB or a public health official makes such a determination, the 
SRMCB or the official must give property owners in the infested 
area written notice of the presence of the nuisance along with in-
structions to abate the nuisance.67 Only when a property owner 
refuses or neglects to abate the nuisance may the SRMCB or the 
board of health take action to abate the nuisance.68 The SRMCB 
enabling statute does not provide, however, that the SRMCB or 
public health official may take action to abate a nuisance through 
engaging in aerial applications of pesticides over broad, populated 
areas. 
The SRMCB enabling statute also permits a state agency to ini-
tiate public hearings to institute low land improvements if it appears 
that the improvements will promote the "public health, safety or 
62 [d. § 1. 
63 See id. §§ 1-14C. Reflecting on the aerial spray program and the ambiguity of the 
commonwealth's authority to conduct the aerial spraying, Thomas McShane, Assistant Sec-
retary of Environmental Affairs, stated that U[p]art of the confusion was caused by the fact 
that no one is statutorily authorized to do this type of thing .... " Alexander Reid, Decision-
Making on Spray Program Questioned, BOSTON GLOBE, Nov. 29, 1990, at 52. 
64 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 252, § 5B (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
66 [d. § 4A. 
66 [d. § 5B. The enabling statute permits the SRMCB to organize local mosquito control 
districts. [d. §§ 4A, 5. 
67 [d. § 5B. The SRMCB or a public health official also must give property owners suggested 
methods of treatment and a date by which the abatement must be complete. [d. 
68 [d. In order to abate a public nuisance, agents or employees of the Board of Health or 
of the Commissioner may enter private property. [d. 
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convenience. "69 Arguably, such improvements could include mea-
sures to eradicate a public health threat posed by mosquitos. This 
section of the SRMCB enabling statute, however, only permits an 
agency to initiate a public hearing to decide whether low land im-
provements are necessary-it does not permit the SRMCB to make 
such improvements. 
2. The Massachusetts Administrative Procedure Act 
Although the SRMCB enabling statute does not specifically permit 
the SRMCB to conduct aerial applications of pesticides, under 
MAPA 70 the SRMCB is authorized to promulgate emergency regu-
lations-potentially allowing an aerial spraying program-that the 
SRMCB could apply in an emergency situation. 71 MAPA generally 
requires that agencies comply with notice and public hearing require-
ments prior to adopting a regulation. 72 If an agency believes, how-
ever, that immediate adoption of a regulation is necessary for the 
preservation of the public health, safety, or general welfare, and 
that adherence to notice and public hearing requirements would be 
contrary to the public interest, the agency may waive these require-
ments and adopt emergency regulations. 73 While in a nonemergency 
situation the SRMCB has to follow the procedure of its enabling 
statute strictly, under MAPA, it conceivably could promulgate emer-
gency regulations to authorize an aerial pesticide spraying pro-
gram. 74 
Moreover, if the governor declares that a public health emergency 
exists, the DPH has the authority to take immediate emergency 
action to address the threat without even promulgating emergency 
regulations. 75 Such authority possibly could involve taking action 
through the SRMCB and temporarily waiving public notification 
requirements. 76 
69 [d. §§ 4A, 5. In order to conduct such a proceeding, however, the agency must follow 
proper notice procedures. [d. § 4A. Such notice includes contacting each known landowner in 
the affected area through registered mail at least seven days before the public hearing. [d. 
§ 5. 
70 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30A, §§ 1-17 (1979 & Supp. 1990). 
71 [d. § 3. 
72 [d. § 2. 
73 [d. § 3. 
74 See id. 
75 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 17, § 2A (1981). Pursuant to such a declaration by the governor, the 
DPH is empowered to address a public health threat by taking emergency action and incurring 
such liabilities as it deems necessary to protect the public health and prevent disease. [d. 
76 See MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 105, §§ 100.330, 100.333 (1988). 
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3. The Massachusetts Pesticide Control Act 
In addition to the fact that the Massachusetts General Laws do 
not specifically provide the SRMCB with the authority to conduct 
aerial applications of pesticides, the regulations promulgated under 
MPCA contain a further restriction on the manner in which the 
SRMCB may apply pesticides. 77 The purpose of MPCA is to conform 
Massachusetts law with federal requirements under FIFRA regard-
ing the registration and certification of pesticides. 78 Among other 
things, MPCA regulates restrictions on the manner in which pesti-
cides are used in Massachusetts. 79 The agency primarily responsible 
for implementing MPCA is the DFA.80 
The MPCA regulations have limited provisions for granting prop-
erty owners a right of exclusion from the aerial application of pes-
ticides. 81 Sprayers are not required to honor such requests for ex-
clusion, however, if the Commissioner of Public Health has certified 
that the pesticide application is for the purpose of protecting the 
public health.82 Although the pesticide regulations require a permit 
from the DF A for all private applications of pesticide by aircraft, 
they do not require a permit for those applications carried out as 
part of mosquito control programs that the SRMCB has approved. 83 
In addition, the MPCA regulations provide a list of conditions that 
sprayers must meet before they can apply pesticides from airplanes 
for nonagricultural purposes such as pest eradication. 84 The regula-
tions state, however, that in the event of an emergency situation 
requiring immediate application of pesticides by aircraft, the DF A 
may waive the two- to ten-day notification provision and expedite 
the notification process by using public service radio and television 
announcements.85 The statutory language of MPCA itself, however, 
does not provide the DF A the authority to waive notice provisions. 
77 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 132B, §§ 1-15 (Supp. 1990). The MPCA regulations are codified at 
MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 333, § 10.03 (1987). 
78 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 333, § 2.02 (1986). 
79 Id. 
80 Id. 
81 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 333, § 10.03(22) (1987). 
82 Id. § 1O.03(22)(b). 
83 I d. § 10. 03(23)(b). 
84 Id. §§ 10.03(21), (22). One significant condition is that the entity initiating the application 
must notify abutting landowners two to ten days before the application of the pesticide. Id. 
§ 10.03(21)(a). The notification must be through a newspaper of general circulation that the 
municipality normally uses for legal notices and must include the following: the purpose of the 
control program; the general location of the control area; the control material to be used; and 
the anticipated date and time of the control program. Id. 
86 Id. § 10.03(21). 
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4. The Massachusetts Environmental Policy Act 
A potentially powerful check on state agency activities that may 
have an adverse affect on the environment is MEP A.86 MEP A man-
dates that prior to conducting an activity that may have an adverse 
affect on the environment, state agencies must determine and eval-
uate the impact of that activity on the environment.87 Furthermore, 
the statute requires that agencies use all practicable means neces-
sary to minimize any damage to the environment resulting from the 
state activity. 88 
The MEP A regulations establish thresholds for activities that will 
receive MEP A review, a procedure that governmental agencies must 
follow, and a timetable for the MEP A review process. 89 If a project 
exceeds the review thresholds set out in the regulations and may 
cause significant harm to the environment, the project proponent 
must prepare and file an environmental notification form (ENF) with 
the Secretary of Environmental Affairs. 90 At the close of the thirty-
day ENF review period, during which time the secretary receives 
agency and public comments, the secretary determines whether it 
is necessary for the project proponent to complete a more detailed 
environmental impact report (EIR).91 
The MEPA statutory language and regulations make exceptions 
to the ENF and EIR requirements in emergency situations, when 
immediate agency action is essential to avoid or eliminate an immi-
nent threat to the public health.92 MEP A, however, also requires 
that in emergency situations an ENF be completed within ten days 
of the commencement of the project; full compliance with all MEPA 
regulations must follow within sixty days.93 The MEP A emergency 
regulations further require that any emergency action taken without 
an ENF or an EIR be the minimum action necessary to avoid or 
eliminate the imminent threat to the environment. 94 
86 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30, §§ 61-62H (1979 & Supp. 1990). 
87 Id. § 61. 
88 Id. 
89 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.01:2 (1987). 
90 Id. 
91 Id. According to MEPA regulations, the purpose of an EIR is to inform project propo-
nents, public decisionmakers, and the general public of the environmental effects of the 
proposed activities. Id. § 11.01:4. 
92 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30, § 62F (1979 & Supp. 1990); MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.11:1 
(1987). 
93 MASS. GEN. L. ch 30, § 62F (1979 & Supp. 1990). 
94 MASS. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.11:2 (1987). Additionally, any EIR subsequently pre-
pared on an emergency project must consider the desirability of taking similar action in similar 
circumstances in the future. Id. 
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Before Massachusetts commenced its aerial spraying program in 
August 1990, a group of citizens from the targeted spray area joined 
as plaintiffs in an effort to stop the program.95 In Dubois v. John-
ston,96 the plaintiffs claimed that the then proposed malathion pro-
gram violated MEPA because the agencies involved in making the 
decision failed to file either an ENF or an EIR.97 Although the 
Plymouth Superior Court did not grant an injunction to stop the 
spraying, the lawsuit brought to light the issue of whether the 
commonwealth should have prepared an evaluation of the potential 
effects of the proposed spraying program. 98 
Soon after the citizens filed the Dubois lawsuit, the Secretary of 
the Executive Office of Environmental Affairs (EOEA) responded 
to a request from the DFA for an opinio~ regarding the applicability 
of MEPA to the proposed aerial spraying program. 99 In a letter 
dated August 27, 1990, the same day the spraying program started, 
an EOEA undersecretary stated that it was the secretary's opinion 
that the project did not meet any of the regulatory thresholds re-
quiring the filing of an ENF.lOO Under MEPA, a negative determi-
nation by the EOEA secretary exempts an agency from filing an 
ENF.lOl Moreover, under Massachusetts law, the EOEA's negative 
determination decision is not reviewable by Massachusetts courtS. 102 
Although the EOEA determined that an ENF was not required 
before the spraying commenced, it did suggest that as a result of 
the public interest in the spraying program, the DF A might wish to 
prepare an ENF as soon as possible after the commonwealth com-
pleted the spraying program. 103 The DFA never prepared an ENF. 
96 Dubois v. Johnston, No. 9O-1736A (Plymouth Super. Ct. Mass. filed Aug. 24, 1990). The 
group filed their complaint pursuant to a Massachusetts statute which permits the superior 
court for the county in which damage to the environment is about to occur to issue a temporary 
restraining order in response to a complaint filed by no less than ten residents of the com-
monwealth. MASS. GEN. L. ch. 214, § 7A (1989 & Supp. 1991). 
96 No. 9O-1736A (Plymouth Super. Ct. Mass. filed Aug. 24, 1990). 
97 Id. 
98 In an unpublished decision, the Plymouth Superior Court denied an injunction to stop 
the spraying. See Seekirl1J to Ground the Aerial Sprayers, MASS. LAW. WEEKLY, Sept. 3, 
1990, at 31 [hereinafter Aerial Sprayers]. 
99 Letter from James Gomes, Undersecretary, EOEA, to Catherine Clement, General 
Counsel, DFA 1 (Aug. 27, 1990) (Request for Opinion, equine encephalitis) (on file with author) 
[hereinafter Request for Opinion]. 
100 Id. 
101 MAss. REGS. CODE tit. 301, § 11.03 (1987). 
102 Cummings v. Secretary of Executive Office of Envtl. Affairs, 402 Mass. 611, 612-19, 
524 N.E.2d 836, 837-40 (1988). 
103 Request for Opinion, supra note 99, at 1. 
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B. Massachusetts Pest Eradication Efforts 
Massachusetts's first experience in addressing the threat posed by 
mosquito populations carrying the EEE virus occurred in 1956, when 
the commonwealth sprayed approximately 150 thousand acres by 
aircraft with DDT, a pesticide that the EPA since has banned. 104 
Before the summer of 1990, Massachusetts officials had initiated one 
other emergency control program, between 1973 and 1975, when 
officials sprayed nearly two million acres in eastern Massachusetts 
with malathion. 105 
Massachusetts officials suspected in April 1990 that a combination 
of heavy rains, an unusually large number of mosquitos, and the 
cyclical appearance of the EEE virus meant that humans would be 
at risk of contracting EEE during the summer.l06 Consequently, the 
DPH issued an advisory to local boards of health warning them of 
the potential risk that EEE posed.107 Three months later, however, 
the DF A-one of the state agencies represented in the SRMCB-
was still uncertain about its role in controlling the health threat and 
about the necessity for an immediate response to the threat posed 
by the mosquitos. 108 
Not only was the SRMCB unsure about the specific measures it 
should employ in addressing the EEE threat, but it also was unsure 
about when it was supposed to act.109 For instance, in a July 16, 
104 EDMAN & CLARK, supra note 52, at 37. 
105 Id. at 38. 
106 Memorandum from Ralph Timperi, Assistant Commissioner for Laboratory and Envi-
ronmental Sciences, & Paul Etkind, Administrative Director, Division of Epidemiology, Bu-
reau of Communicable Disease Control to Local Boards of Health and Mosquito Control 
Districts 1 (Apr. 1990) (advisory on EEE) (on file with author). 
107 Id. 
108 Memorandum from Mark Buffone, Entomologist, DF A to August Schumacher, Com-
missioner, DFA 1-2 (July 3, 1990) (strategy to address EEE threat) (on file with author). 
Although Mr. Buffone noted that, due to the potential consequences of the virus, "[i]t is 
imperative that ... we advance a strategy to adequately address this matter at all levels," 
he nonetheless claimed that it was "premature to activate and/or approve any operational 
response without further evidence to support actions such as intensified spraying," including 
the decision to upscale ground spraying. Id. at 1. In July, Buffone wrote to the chairman of 
the Department of Entomology at the University of Massachusetts to ask for his advice in 
developing a strategy to address a potential outbreak of EEE. Letter from Mark Buffone, 
Entomologist, DFA to John Edman, Chairman of the Department of Entomology, University 
of Massachusetts 2 (July 16, 1990) (on file with author). Mr. Buffone pointed out that, although 
no human cases of EEE yet had been reported, a small block aerial spraying program in the 
specific area where EEE-carrying mosquitos had been located could be prudent. He felt that 
any action taken after human cases appeared might be "purely political." Id. at 3. This letter 
indicated that the DFA had not yet developed a clear program of specific action to control 
mosquito populations. See id. 
109 See Letter from Charles Costa, Chairman, SRMCB to David Mulligan, Commissioner, 
866 ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS [Vol. 19:851 
1990 letter to the commissioner of the DPH, the chairman of the 
SRMCB noted that although his agency was responsible for mosquito 
control, he was uncertain about what the DPH was doing to prevent 
an outbreak of the EEE virus. 110 More specifically, he was unsure 
about the conditions that would constitute a public health threat and 
at what point the DPH would declare a public health emergency. 111 
Four months after DPH alerted state officials that there was an 
elevated risk to humans of contracting the EEE virus from mosqui-
tos, state agencies finally started to take action. 112 On August 7, 
1990, the DPH apprised its umbrella organization, the Executive 
Office of Human Services, of the impending public health emergency 
due to the presence of the EEE virus in Massachusetts. 113 Conse-
quently, on August 15, the Department of Human Services's secre-
tary wrote to the secretary of the EOEA to urge him to take action 
to reduce the threat of EEE.·114 On the same day, the EOEA sec-
retary informed Massachusetts Governor Michael Dukakis of a pro-
posal to use aircraft to spray malathion over high-risk areas in 
southeastern Massachusetts. 115 Later, on August 22, the SRMCB 
publicly announced a health emergency due to the unusually high 
number of mosquitos that were found to be carrying EEE.116 
In this notice of a health emergency, the SRMCB stated that it 
was taking steps for the eradication of mosquitos pursuant to para-
graphs eighteen and nineteen of the Massachusetts Wetlands Pro-
tection Act. ll7 Neither provision, however, grants the SRMCB the 
authority to conduct aerial pesticide spraying. 118 While paragraph 
eighteen states that the Wetlands Protection Act does not apply to 
DPH 1-2 (July 16, 1990) (response to DPH health advisory concerning EEE) (on file with 
author). 
110 [d. at 2. 
111 [d. 
112 See, e.g., Letter from Van Dunn, Deputy Commissioner, DPH to Ken Schwartz, Assis-
tant Secretary, EOHS 1 (Aug. 7, 1990) (supporting request of EOEA's request for emergency 
funding to reduce mosquito populations) (on file with author). 
113 [d. 
114 Memorandum from Philip Johnston, Secretary, EOHS to John DeViliars, Secretary, 
EOEA 1 (Aug. 15, 1990) (on file with author). Johnston stated that it was his "understanding" 
that while the DPH monitors the EEE risk to humans, the "legal responsibility" for addressing 
mosquito control is within the EOEA. [d. 
115 Memorandum from John DeViliars, supra note 3, at 2. 
116 STATE RECLAMATION AND MOSQUITO CONTROL BOARD, NOTICE OF HEALTH EMER-
GENCY AND MOSQUITO ERADICATION 1 (Aug. 22, 1990). 
117 [d. The Massachusetts Wetlands Protection Act is codified at MASS. GEN. L. ch. 131, 
§§ 40, 40A (1974). 
118 MASS. GEN. L. ch. 131 § 40, paras. 18-19. 
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mosquito control work done under the SRMCB's enabling act, 119 
paragraph nineteen is merely an exemption from the requirement 
that persons wishing to "remove, fill, dredge or alter" any wetland 
file a notice of intention to the conservation commission. 120 
On August 23, 1990, the DF A commissioner issued a declaration 
of emergency stating that the immediate application of pesticides by 
aircraft was necessary.121 The declaration further stated that, as a 
result of the emergency, and in accordance with MPCA regulations, 
the DFA was waiving the two- to ten-day notice requirement and 
was expediting the notification process by providing the public with 
twenty-four-hour notification through public service radio and tele-
vision announcements. l22 Although the DF A believed that the two-
to ten-day notice to the public was "not feasible", 123 Governor Du-
kakis did not issue a declaration of a public emergency, nor were 
public parks and forests in southeastern Massachusetts closed. 124 The 
DPH and the EOEA stated that they did not contemplate closing 
campsites or parks during this emergency because "campers are best 
prepared to cope with mosquitos."125 
On August 27, 1990, the same day that the commonwealth's aerial 
spraying program commenced, public health officials announced the 
first confirmed case of EEE.l26 Later that day, the judge presiding 
over the Dubois lawsuit denied the plaintiffs' request for a full 
temporary restraining order. He did declare, however, that the 
spraying had to comply with malathion's labeling instructions and 
could not occur on or within 400 feet of bodies of water that were 
more than a half an acre in size. 127 Nonetheless, immediately after 
the three-day program began, there were reports from people living 
in the spray area that the airplane pilots had violated both the 
pesticide's labeling instructions and the Dubois court order by spray-
ing malathion over several bodies of water. 128 
119 [d. § 40, para. 18. 
120 [d. § 40, para. 19. 
121 MASSACHUSETI'S DEP'T OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, DECLARATION OF EMERGENCY 
FOR AERIAL SPRAYING FOR THE CONTROL OF EASTERN ENCEPHALITIS 1 (Aug. 23, 1990). 
122 [d. 
123 [d. 
124 Chapman, supra note 1, at 9. 
126 Statement of Secretaries DeViliars and Johnston on Eastern Equine Encephalitis 3 
(undated) (press release from EOEA) (on file with author). 
126 See, e.g., Encephalitis Case Confirmed; Judge Refuses to Halt Spraying, BOSTON 
GLOBE, Aug. 28, 1990, at 1. 
127 Aerial Sprayers, supra note 98, at 31. 
128 See Brown & Tate, supra note 5, at 9, 28. 
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In the aftermath of the spraying, at least nine people were re-
ported hospitalized for exposure to malathion, with one person in an 
intensive care facility. 129 Additionally, test results showed that along 
with scores of mosquitos, malathion killed over one million fish in 
southeastern Massachusetts. l30 While the Division of Fisheries and 
Wildlife estimates that the average rate of fish kills in Massachusetts 
is one per month, at least sixteen fish kills were reported in south-
eastern Massachusetts on August 27 and 28 during or shortly after 
the spraying. 131 Because one of the species involved, killifish, preys 
on mosquito larvae, environmentalists were concerned that the 
spraying would exacerbate the problem of EEE because it may 
result in a resurgence of larger popUlations of mosquitos in subse-
quent years. 132 
IV. CALIFORNIA'S STATUTORY SCHEME AND PEST CONTROL 
EFFORTS 
A. California Statutes Governing Pest Eradication 
1. The California Food and Agriculture Code 
California law grants broad statutory authority to the director of 
the California Department of Food and Agriculture (CDF A)l33 and 
to the state's governorl34 to combat pest infestations. The California 
Food and Agriculture Code classifies any "premises, plants, convey-
ances or things which are infected or infested with any pest, or 
premises where any pest is found" as a public nuisance. 135 The code 
permits the CDFA to abate public nuisances136 and authorizes it to 
designate any area within the state an "eradication area. "137 More-
over, the CDFA director may take such action as he or she "thinks 
is necessary" to abate or control pests within the eradication area. 138 
129 Id. 
lao Franklin, supra note 6, at 49. 
131 Chapman, supra note 1, at 9. 
132 Franklin, supra note 6, at 49. 
133 See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 5001-8808 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
134 See CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 8625-8629 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). 
135 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 5401 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
136 Id. 
137 [d. § 5761. 
138 [d. § 5763. 
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In the past, the director repeatedly has used this authority to control 
pests by applying malathion from helicopters over populated areas. 139 
The CDF A must follow certain procedures when it initiates an 
eradication program. It must publish in a newspaper of general 
circulation a written decision describing the proposed action, includ-
ing findings as to the need for the action and the statutory basis for 
that action. 140 The California Food and Agriculture Code also man-
dates that the CDF A use nonpesticide alternatives to the maximum 
extent feasible. 141 
The public notice that the CDF A must provide before exercising 
its authority varies between urban areas142 and nonurban areas. 143 
While the code directs the CDFA to provide individual notice to 
landowners in urban areas, the notice requirements in nonurban 
areas are far less stringent. 144 In nonurban areas, California law does 
not require that the CDFA give the public any notice before the 
decision to spray is made, and the only mandatory notice after the 
CDFA makes its decision is the pUblication of the decision in a 
newspaper of general circulation. 145 Because no mandatory time for 
publication is required by law, however, spraying conceivably could 
occur before the newspaper publication. 146 
2. The California Environmental Quality Act 
Like its Massachusetts counterpart MEPA, the California Envi-
ronmental Quality Act (CEQA) is designed to make state officials 
analyze the long-term environmental effects of state actions. 147 The 
California Supreme Court has held that an agency should prepare 
an EIR whenever the agency perceives some substantial evidence 
that the project may have a significant environmental effect, or that 
the action arguably will have an adverse environmental impact. 148 
139 See Dolan, supm note 8, at AI, col. 5, A22, col. 1. 
140 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 5051 (West 1990). This decision must include written fact 
findings about each element of the decision, including the use or nonuse of nonpesticide 
alternatives. [d. 
141 [d. 
142 See id. §§ 5771-5780. 
143 See id. § 5051. 
144 [d. 
1 .. See id. 
146 [d. See generally Janet D. Robinson, State Mandated Pesticide Application and the 
Due Process Rights of Organic Farmers, 17 PAC. L.J. 1301 (1986). 
1'7 CAL. PuB. RES. CoDE § 21000 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
148 No Oil, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 13 Cal. 3d 68, 85, 118 Cal. Rptr. 34, 45 (1974). 
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While the CEQA regulations state that one of the statute's basic 
purposes is to inform governmental decisionmakers and the public 
about the potential environmental effects of proposed activities, 149 
the state legislature specifically has exempted area-wide pesticide 
spraying programs from the EIR requirement of CEQA.150 Prior to 
1985, the legislature allowed all state agencies to use an abbreviated 
administrative process in lieu of the normal EIR process in instances 
when their regulatory programs required a operational plan contain-
ing information about potential environmental impacts. 151 Because 
the operational plan required under the California Food and Agri-
culture Code for state-mandated aerial spraying programs required 
such environmental information,152 state officials considered aerial 
spraying programs to be exempt from CEQA's EIR requirement. 
In 1985, however, residents from northern California attacked a 
state pesticide program in their area and successfully enjoined the 
state from conducting an aerial spraying program.153 Although in 
Citizens for Non-Toxic Pest Control v. California Department of 
Food and Agriculturel54 the state argued that its actions fell within 
the exemption to the EIR requirement, the California Court of 
Appeals held that the CDFA had not met CEQA review require-
ments. 155 As a result of this decision, the state legislature passed 
legislation specifically exempting CDF A spraying programs from 
CEQA review requirements. 156 Although that legislation was never 
successfully challenged in court, the California legislature since has 
amended the legislation to delete any specific references to CDF A 
pest eradication programs by name. 157 
149 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15359 (1986). 
150 1985 Cal. Legis. Servo ch. 1284, § 4 (West) (amending CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080.5 
(West 1986». 
151 Id.; see also, Daryl S. Landy, The Constitutional Implications of Government Pesticide 
Spraying: The Case for Limited Judicial Intervention and an Intermediate Standard of 
Review, 76 CAL. L. REV. 221, 223 (1988). An agency could submit such a plan in lieu of an 
EIR if the plan described the proposed activity, including alternatives to the activity and 
mitigation measures to minimize any significant environmental impact, and was available for 
a reasonable time for review and comment by other public agencies and the general public. 
CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080.5 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
152 See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 5051 (West 1986), amended by 1987 Cal. Legis. Servo 
ch. 1284, § 2 (West). 
153 Citizens for Non-Toxic Pest Control v. California Dep't of Food and Agric., 187 Cal. 
App. 3d 1575, 1589, 232 Cal. Rptr. 729, 736 (1986). 
154 187 Cal. App. 3d 1575, 232 Cal. Rptr. 729. 
155 Id. at 1585-86, 232 Cal. Rptr. at 734. 
156 1985 Cal. Legis. Servo ch. 1282, § 4 (West) (adding subdivision (k) to CAL. PUB. RES. 
CODE § 21080.5). 
157 CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080.5(k) (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). Subdivision (k) formerly 
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3. The California Emergency Services Act 
The California Emergency Services Act also exempts actions by 
state officials from CEQA's review requirements in certain situa-
tions. l58 The statute permits the governor, by declaring a state of 
emergency, to exercise complete authority over all state agencies. 159 
The statute also permits the governor to declare a state of emer-
gency in an area when he or she finds the safety of persons or 
property to be in extreme peril as a result of plant infestation or 
disease,l60 and finds local authority inadequate to cope with the 
emergency.161 During such an emergency, the governor has complete 
authority to exercise, within the emergency area, all police power 
vested in the state. 162 Furthermore, the state is not liable for any 
claim based on a discretionary function of a state agency acting 
pursuant to the Emergency Services Act. 163 
B. California's Pest Control Efforts 
Just as it had seven times before during the previous decade, the 
state of California waged an aggressive campaign to control an in-
festation by the medfly during 1990. 164 The 1990 program began after 
the discovery on July 20, 1989, of the first of 270 medflies. 165 While 
the medfly is not a native to California, state officials claim that the 
medfly can infest over 200 varieties of fruit and has the potential to 
cause $200 million in crop damages. l66 Upon a declaration of an· 
emergency from the governor,167 the CDF A organized a program to 
apply malathion over approximately 536 square miles in parts of five 
read: "Any program for the regulation of pesticides certified pursuant to this section ... shall 
apply to the use of pesticides by any state agency acting under the authority of Divisions 4 
... and 5 of the Food and Agricultural Code in eradicating a plant or animal pest." [d. 
158 CAL. GoV'T CODE §§ 8625-8629 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). 
169 [d. § 8627. 
160 [d. §§ 8558-8625; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15359 (1986). The code defines 
"emergency" as a "sudden, unexpected occurrence, involving a clear and imminent danger, 
demanding immediate action to prevent or mitigate loss of, or damage to life, health, property, 
or essential public services." CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15359 (1986). 
161 CAL. GoV'T CODE § 8625 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). 
162 [d. § 8627. The governor also is permitted to promulgate, issue, and enforce orders and 
regulations deemed necessary to address an emergency. [d. 
163 See, e.g., LaBadie v. California, 208 Cal. App. 3d 1366, 1369, 256 Cal. Rptr. 604, 606 
(1989); Farmers Ins. Exch. v. California, 175 Cal. App. 3d 494, 501, 221 Cal Rptr. 225, 229 
(1985). 
164 Dolan, supra note 8, at A22, col. 1. 
166 Dunn, supra note 14, at A30, col. 2. 
166 Talevich v. Voss, 734 F. Supp. 425, 427-28 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
167 [d. at 427. 
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counties in southern California by helicopter.168 By June 1990, the 
spraying program involved more than 480 workers and cost state 
taxpayers approximately $36 million. 169 In all, the state dropped 
about 47,000 gallons of malathion on the spray area and employed 
close to four billion sterile medflies to breed the medfly out of exis-
tence. 170 
While the state monitored the effects of an aerial application of 
malathion on humans and the environment during the 1981-1982 
medfly operation, it did not undertake similar monitoring during the 
1990 campaign. 171 Although the results of the 1981-1982 tests showed 
that aerial spraying killed honey bees, ladybugs, and butterflies and 
produced outbreaks of harmful pests such as aphids, the tests did 
not show a correlation between human health problems and mala-
thion spraying.172 Many individuals exposed to the malathion during 
the 1990 medfly operation-including homeless persons unable to 
avoid contact with the spray-complained of flu-like symptoms in 
the wake of aerial sprayings.173 
After the state initiated its 1990 program, California entomologists 
expressed concern that the medfly may never be eradicated com-
pletely from the region.174 Entomologists cited several reasons for 
this belief: the region's warm weather, which leads to active breed-
ing; the continued discoveries of more flies outside the eradication 
zone; the presence of a large international airport serving frequent 
travelers to places where the medfly is endemic; the region's wide 
variety of hosts on which the medfly may feed; and finally, the area's 
prevailing winds, which can carry a fly about eight miles. 175 On 
November 5, 1990, however, the state once again declared victory 
in its efforts to eradicate the medfly.176 
V. PAST JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO AERIAL SPRAYING PROGRAMS 
IN CALIFORNIA 
In California, where aerial pesticide programs have resulted in 
litigation, courts have applied a deferential standard of review to 
168 Ashley Dunn, Officials Wary as Spraying Ends, L.A. TIMES, June 14, 1990, at A3, col. 
3. 
169 [d. at A39, col. 1. 
170 [d. 
171 Dolan, supra note 8, at A22, col. 3. 
172 [d. 
173 See Talevich v. Voss, 734 F. Supp. 425, 428 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
174 Dolan, supra note 8, at A22, col. 3. 
176 [d. at AI, col. 6. 
176 Dunn, supra note 11, at Bl, col. 2. 
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the state's pest eradication activities. 177 Because most of the litiga-
tion has involved economic issues rather than issues of fundamental 
rights, the courts have required merely that the means used by the 
state bear a reasonable relation to the ends sought to be attained. 178 
Employing such a relaxed standard, California courts have found 
that landowners were not entitled to pre-abatement judicial chal-
lenge,179 actual notice or an opportunity to be heard prior to the 
abatement activity,180 or compensation for property damage result-
ing from spraying operations. 181 
An early example of the California courts' deference to the CDFA's 
exercise of its abatement authority, Skinner v. Coy,182 involved de-
struction of diseased peach trees rather than aerial spraying to 
eradicate insects. In Skinner, a landowner filed an injunction to stop 
a county agricultural agent from entering his property and destroy-
ing certain peach trees that he owned; the trees allegedly were 
infested with peach mosaic, a transmittable and infectious disease. 183 
Although the trial court granted the injunction, the California Su-
preme Court reversed, deferring to the administrative determina-
tion that a nuisance existed, and agreed that the state had the 
authority summarily to eradicate the public nuisance posed by the 
trees. l84 The Skinner court stated that statutes providing for the 
summary destruction of vegetation infected with contagious pests 
without any pre-abatement judicial inquiry are constitutional as long 
as they define what constitutes a nuisance and provide a right to 
post-abatement judicial review. 185 
Judicial deference toward state or municipal officials in cases in-
volving the destruction of vegetation was also evident in Thain v. 
City of Palo AltO.l86 In Thain, a resident challenged a city "weed" 
ordinance that permitted city officials to declare certain vegetation 
177 See generally Skinner v. Coy, 13 Cal. 2d 407, 90 P.2d 296 (1939); Farmers Ins. Exch. 
v. California, 175 Cal. App. 3d 494, 221 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1985); Thain v. City of Palo Alto, 207 
Cal. App. 2d 173, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1962); see also Victor M. Sher, Pests, Poisons, and 
Power: Constitutional Implications of State Pest Eradication Projects in California, 1 J. 
ENVTL. L. & LITIG. 89, 96-105 (1986). 
178 See, e.g., Farmers, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 501-02,221 Cal. Rptr. at 229; Thain, 207 Cal. 
App. 2d. at 186, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23. 
179 Skinner, 13 Cal. 2d at 417-18,90 P.2d at 301. 
180 Thain, 207 Cal. App. 2d at 189, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 524-25. 
181 Farmers, 175 Cal. App. 3d at 502, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 229-80. 
182 13 Cal. 2d 407, 90 P.2d 296. 
183 Id. at 409-10, 90 P.2d at 297-SOO. 
18< Id. 
186 Id. 
186 207 Cal. App. 2d 173, 24 Cal. Rptr. 515 (1962). 
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a public nuisance and abate the nuisance should individual property 
owners fail to do so themselves. 187 The plaintiff claimed that the 
ordinance was unconstitutional because it failed to provide landown-
ers with actual notice of the city's intent to abate the nuisance. l88 
The Thain court held that the ordinance was a valid exercise of 
police power because it promoted the public welfare, and that a 
rational ground existed for its enactment. 189 Moreover, the court 
found that the plaintiff was not entitled to actual notice because of 
a provision in the ordinance stating that the presence of "all" weeds 
on "any" property constitutes a public nuisance. l90 According to the 
court, this provision put the plaintiff on notice that city officials could 
abate public nuisances on all property, including the plaintiff's prop-
erty.191 
In a case directly addressing the problems resulting from aerial 
spraying of malathion, Farmers Insurance Exchange v. Califor-
nia,l92 the California Court of Appeals deferred to the CDF A's au-
thority to eradicate pests and refused to allow citizens compensation 
for property damage resulting from a CDF A spraying program. 193 
In Farmers, plaintiff insurance companies sued the state for reim-
bursement claims for damage to automobile paint resulting from the 
state's aerial pesticide spraying program. l94 The court held that 
because the damages were inflicted in the course of the proper 
exercise of the state's police power, they were noncompensable. 195 
In this instance, the state action was proper because the court 
deemed the spraying to be reasonably necessary to protect the 
safety, health, and general welfare of the community. 196 
Although the Skinner, Thain, and Farmers courts addressed the 
issue of economic harm rather than personal injury, California courts 
subsequently refused to compensate plaintiffs for personal injury 
187 [d. at 177, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 517. 
188 [d. at 180, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 519. 
188 [d. at 186-87, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 522-23. See generally Patrick v. Riley, 209 Cal. 350, 287 
P. 455 (1930) (director of agriculture pennitted summarily to destroy cows suffering from 
bovine tuberculosis). The Patrick court stated that "health regulations enacted by the state 
under its police power and providing even drastic measures for the elimination of disease, 
whether in human beings, crops or cattle, in a general way are not affected by constitutional 
provisions, either of the state or national government." 209 Cal. at 354-55, 287 P. at 456. 
190 Thain, 207 Cal. App. 2d at 191, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 526. 
191 [d. at 191-92, 24 Cal. Rptr. at 526-27. 
192 175 Cal. App. 3d 494, 221 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1985). 
198 [d. at 502, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 226. 
UN [d. at 498-99, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 227. 
196 [d. at 504-05, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 231. 
198 [d. at 501-02, 221 Cal. Rptr. at 229. 
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allegedly resulting from state aerial spraying measures. 197 In Tal-
evich v. VOSS,l98 the United States District Court for the Central 
District of California refused to grant an injunction to stop further 
aerial spraying of malathion because the court did not find that 
exposure to the pesticide caused the plaintiffs' injuries. l99 The plain-
tiffs, who were homeless, claimed that they suffered the flu-like 
symptoms commonly associated with malathion poisoning because 
they did not have access to adequate shelter and thus were unable 
to avoid contact with the malathion that state officials had sprayed. 200 
Although the court found that the plaintiffs' injuries were consistent 
with malathion poisoning, it refused to grant an injunction because 
the plaintiffs failed to show a causal connection between their injuries 
and the malathion spraying. 201 
Similarly, the California Court of Appeals found in LaBadie v. 
California202 that a plaintiff who suffered injuries as a result of her 
exposure to malathion could not recover in an action for misrepre-
sentation against the state. The plaintiff in LaBadie, who was 
acutely sensitive to malathion, suffered physical injury as a result 
of her exposure to malathion sprayed during a declared state of 
emergency.203 The plaintiff took measures to avoid contact with the 
malathion and left the spray area during the time CDF A officials 
claimed they would be spraying. 204 Because the spraying continued 
beyond the stated time, the plaintiff unknowingly returned to her 
home during the course of the spraying operation. 205 The court held 
that the state was immune from the plaintiff's claim because it found 
the Emergency Services Act's immunity provision to encompass not 
only "discretionary" acts but also the "performance of" or "failure 
to perform" such acts. 206 
VI. POSSIBILITY OF HEIGHTENED SCRUTINY IN FUTURE JUDICIAL 
CHALLENGES TO AERIAL SPRAYING PROGRAMS 
In practice, the minimum level of review-requiring the state's 
means to have a reasonable relationship to its ends---ean amount to 
197 Talevich v. Voss, 734 F. Supp. 425, 430-34 (C.D. Cal. 1990); LaBadie v. California, 208 
Cal. App. 3d 1366, 1367-69, 256 Cal. Rptr. 604, 605-06 (1989). 
198 734 F. Supp 425 (C.D. Cal. 1990). 
199 [d. at 428. 
200 [d. 
201 [d. at 434. 
202 208 Cal. App. 3d 1146, 256 Cal. Rptr. 604 (1989). 
20S [d. at 1368, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 605. 
204 [d. 
206 [d. 
206 [d. at 1369, 256 Cal. Rptr. at 606. 
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no review at all, and courts often presume facts supporting a legis-
lative judgment.207 Therefore, it is unlikely that a court applying 
such a deferential standard ever would find that a state-mandated 
aerial application of pesticides was not reasonably related to the goal 
of pest eradication. If, however, a court found that state legislation 
burdened the exercise of a fundamental personal right, the court 
would apply a more exacting standard of review than the minimum 
rationality standard.208 Under such circumstances, the court would 
require that the law be narrowly tailored to meet a compelling or 
substantial governmental interest. 209 
When deciding whether a right is "fundamental", courts do not 
constrain themselves necessarily to the text of the Bill of Rights, 
but may look to the "traditions and [collective] conscience of our 
people"210 and the values "implicit in the concept of ordered lib-
erty. "211 In the past, the application of this strict level of scrutiny 
has led courts to strike down laws infringing upon the right to 
privacy,212 autonomy,213 and family relations.214 
If courts found that persons have a constitutionally protected right 
to be free from exposure to toxic pesticides, the level of judicial 
scrutiny applicable thus would be far more strict than the level 
currently applied.215 Plaintiffs in these cases may find such a right 
within the bounds of the constitutional rights to privacy and auton-
omy, both of which include the right to make decisions about fun-
damental matters.216 The United States Supreme Court has recog-
207 See, e.g., United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, 153-54 (1938). 
208 See generally Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to abortion); Griswold v. Con-
necticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (use of contraceptives); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 
510 (1925) (law requiring children to attend public schools); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 
(1923) (law forbidding teaching of foreign languages to children). 
009 Roe, 410 U.S. at 155; Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 63:h!l8 (1969) (state law 
denying welfare assistance to residents of less than one year); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 12 (1967) (Virginia law preventing marriage between persons solely on basis of race); 
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (Oklahoma law providing for sterilization of 
habitual criminals of felonies involving moral turpitude). 
210 See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 493 (Goldberg, J., concurring, quoting Snyder v. 
Massachusetts, 291 U.S. 97, 105 (1933». 
211 [d. at 500 (Harlan, J., concurring, quoting Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 
(1937». 
212 See, e.g., Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485-86. 
213 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 166. 
214 See, e.g., Moore v. East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 506 (1977) (invalidation of zoning 
ordinance limiting occupancy of dwelling to members of single "family", narrowly defined to 
include only a few categories of related individuals). 
216 See Sher, supra note 177, at 96-105. 
218 See, e.g., Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53 (guarantee of personal privacy includes those "personal 
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nized the right to bodily integrity in a variety of intimate matters. 217 
Further, the Supreme Court has held that, absent a compelling 
countervailing government interest, the right of individual autonomy 
is paramount. 218 
One commentator has drawn an analogy between the personal 
interest in remaining free from exposure to toxic pesticides and the 
constitutionally protected interest in remaining free to decide 
whether to submit to the treatment of antipsychotic drugs. 219 Al-
though courts recognize that the government has a legitimate inter-
est in protecting its citizens from the mentally ill, and that this 
protection sometimes may entail the forcible administration of drugs, 
they still recognize that mental patients retain a liberty interest in 
being free from involuntary exposure to such drugs.22O With this 
right to be free from involuntary exposure in mind, courts decide 
cases involving the forcible administration of drugs by balancing the 
competing individual and governmental interests. 221 
Although states have a legitimate interest in protecting citizens 
from the agricultural effects of medflies and the health effects of 
EEE-bearing mosquitos, courts should recognize that citizens also 
retain a liberty interest iIi being free from involuntary exposure to 
toxic pesticides. Even though the governmental interest in protect-
ing the public welfare may outweigh the individual liberty interest 
in a given situation, the recognition of such an interest at least would 
give citizens a "hook" on which to hang a constitutional challenge. 
Moreover, the recognition of such a right would force a state to tailor 
its spraying programs narrowly to cause the smallest possible intru-
sion on that individual right rather than providing a broad "reason-
able" basis for its decision. 
rights that can be deemed 'fundamental' or 'implicit in the concept of ordered liberty"') (quoting 
Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937»; Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. I, 12 (1967) 
(fundamental right to marriage); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (fundamental 
right to procreation). 
217 See, e.g., Carey v. Population Servo Int'l, 431 U.S. 678, 684-86 (1977) (use of contracep-
tives); Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-54 (abortion); Loving, 388 U.S. at 12 (marriage); Skinner, 316 
U.S. at 541 (procreation). 
218 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-53. 
219 Sher, supra note 177, at 99-101. 
2!10 Bee V. Greaves, 744 F.2d 1387, 1391-94 (10th Cir. 1984), em denied,· 469 U.S. 1214 
(1985); Rogers V. Okin, 634 F.2d 650, 653 (1st Cir. 1980), vacated and remanded on other 
grounds sub nom. Mills V. Rogers, 457 U.S. 291, 299, 306 (1982); see also Washington V. 
Harper, 494 U.S. 210, 219-27 (1990) (court upheld prison policy requiring forcible administra-
tion of treatment with antipsychotic drugs to mentally ill state prisoner against prisoner's will 
and without judicial hearing). 
221 Bee, 744 F.2d at 1395-96; Rogers, 634 F.2d at 657. 
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Finding a fundamental right and applying a heightened level of 
scrutiny to litigation involving toxic pesticides may be problematic 
because of the difficulty in proving causation in toxic tort cases. 222 
The California courts' reluctance to draw the connection between 
human health problems and the spraying of a toxic pesticide in 
Talevich may be indicative of how future courts will treat judicial 
challenges to malathion spraying programs.223 Lacking concrete data 
on the specific hazards associated with human exposure to malathion, 
courts are unlikely to find that a fundamental interest is at stake, 
and therefore are not likely to apply heightened scrutiny. 
With greater research, however, it may be possible to understand 
fully the effects of malathion on the public. Using the results of more 
detailed research, courts may be able to make an informed decision 
about whether heightened scrutiny is appropriate. Lacking sufficient 
scientific data, state legislatures should recognize that it is unwise 
to allow unwilling state residents and the environment to be exposed 
to toxic pesticides. Therefore, legislators in Massachusetts and Cal-
ifornia should amend state law to provide greater protection to the 
public from policy decisions that fail to consider long-term public 
impact. Furthermore, such amendments should prevent public offi-
cials from circumventing the environmental legislation designed to 
force them to consider the long-term environmental impact of their 
actions. 
VII. ANALYSIS OF THE MASSACHUSETTS MALATHION PROGRAM 
A.Violation of FIFRA 
If reports from residents in southeastern Massachusetts are ac-
curate, it appears as though the Commonwealth violated FIFRA 
labeling instructions by discharging malathion within 400 feet of 
bodies of water more than half an acre in size. 224 Because it is up to 
the Massachusetts DF A to enforce such violations,225 and the DF A 
was largely responsible for the spraying program, however, it is 
unlikely that any legal action will be forthcoming. 
222 See generally Rory A. Valas, Comment, Toxic Palsgraf: Proving Causation When the 
Link Between Conduct and Injury Appears Highly Extraordinary, 18 B.C. ENVTL. AFF. L. 
REV. 773 (1991). 
223 See supra notes 198-201 and accompanying text. 
224 See 7 U.S.C. § 136 (1988); see also supra notes 41-51 and accompanying text. 
225 See 7 U.S.C. § 136w-1 (1988). 
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B. Violation of State Law 
Pursuant to the SRMCB's enabling statute, the SRMCB either 
must declare a public nuisance and allow landowners in an infested 
area the opportunity to abate the public nuisance themselves,226 or 
must hold a public hearing to decide whether it should make low 
land improvements.227 If the SRMCB decides that EEE-bearing 
mosquitos pose a public nuisance, it may take action only after the 
affected landowners fail to take the required remedial measures.228 
The SRMCB's enabling statute does not provide for emergency pest 
control measures that preempt landowners' right to take these mea-
sures themselves. 
If a state agency decides that low land improvements will promote 
the "public health, safety or convenience," it may initiate public 
hearings only after it has given proper notice to the affected land-
owners.229 As stated earlier, however, the right to call for such 
hearings does not give the SRMCB the right to take action without 
the consent of those landowners.23o Therefore, it would seem that 
initiating an aerial spraying program over 700 thousand acres of land 
without either first allowing affected landowners an opportunity to 
abate the nuisance themselves or holding a public hearing to discuss 
the wisdom of making such "improvements" would be beyond the 
scope of the SRMCB's authority under its enabling statute. 
In its "Notice of Health Emergency and Mosquito Eradication," 
however, the SRMCB did not state that it was acting pursuant to 
its authority under its enabling statute. 231 Instead, the SRMCB 
claimed that it was acting pursuant to an exemption provided in the 
Wetlands Protection Act.232 The Wetlands Protection Act, however, 
does not give the SRMCB the authority to conduct aerial pesticide 
sprayings; rather, it merely restricts persons who wish to "remove, 
fill, dredge or alter" wetlands. 233 
The SRMCB may have been able to conduct an emergency aerial 
spraying operation pursuant to emergency regulations. 234 Such emer-
gency regulations would have permitted the SRMCB temporarily to 
226 MASS GEN.L. ch. 252, § 5B (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
227 ld. §§ 4A, 5. 
228 ld. § 5B. 
229 ld. §§ 4A, 5. 
230 See id. 
231 See STATE RECLAMATION AND MOSQUITO CONTROL BOARD, supra note 116, at 1. 
232 ld. 
233 MAss. GEN. L. ch. 131, § 40 (1974). 
234 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 30A, § 3 (1979). 
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waive notice and public hearing requirements if adherence to those 
requirements would have been contrary to the public interest. 235 
Because the SRMCB did not attempt to promulgate any emergency 
regulations, its activities were outside the bounds of the authority 
vested in it by the legislature. 236 
Although the August 23, 1990 declaration of emergency by the 
DF A commissioner purportedly exempted the SRMCB from the 
Massachusetts pesticide regulations,237 it is unclear whether the 
DF A was authorized to promUlgate regulations waiving notice re-
quirements-MPCA's language does not provide this authority. Be-
cause the DFA's decision to waive its notice requirements affected 
such a large number of people in a direct and conceivably harmful 
manner, and because the legislature did not explicitly give the DFA 
the authority to waive the requirements, the DFA arguably ex-
ceeded the authority the state legislature granted it under MPCA. 
Upon a declaration from the governor that a public health emer-
gency exists, the commissioner of public health may take such action 
as "he may deem necessary" to assure the maintenance of public 
health.238 Arguably, pursuant to an emergency declaration from the 
governor, the commissioner could have ordered the SRMCB to con-
duct its aerial spraying program. Because the governor failed to 
make such a declaration, however, the commissioner of public health 
did not have the authority to take such action. 
c. Amending Massachusetts Law 
Massachusetts law is currently unclear about the criteria to be 
used in determining when a public health threat exists. Further, the 
law is unclear regarding the actions that are appropriate under the 
varying circumstances of a public health threat. While Massachusetts 
law recognizes that mosquitos may pose a public health risk, the law 
does not state specifically the means to be used, or the coordination 
between state agencies that is necessary, to conduct a massive erad-
ication program.239 Moreover, because the EOEA secretary may 
exempt spraying activities from MEPA review requirements,240 Mas-
sachusetts officials are not required either to analyze the full effects 
235 [d. 
236 See MAss. GEN. L. ch. 252, §§ 1-14C (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
237 See MASSACHUSETTS DEP'T OF FOOD AND AGRICULTURE, supra note 121, at 1. 
236 MASS. GEN.L. ch. 17, § 2A (1981 & Supp. 1990). 
239 See MASS. GEN. L. ch. 252, §§ 1-14C (1988 & Supp. 1990). 
240 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. 
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of their activities on the public and the environment or to plan for 
future threats to the public health. Consequently, decisionmakers 
do not have to consider the long-term interests of the public and the 
environment when deciding how the state should address an imme-
diate public health threat. The immediate and certain threat of mos-
quitos bearing the EEE virus easily outweighs the intangible threat 
of malathion. 
As the law currently stands, the SRMCB does not have the clear 
authority to conduct the type of wide-scale aerial spraying program 
that occurred in August 1990. If the state legislature wants the 
SRMCB to have such authority, it should amend state law specifically 
to give the SRMCB that authority. More importantly, because the 
EEE virus appears cyclically, and an outbreak therefore will occur 
again in the future, the legislature should amend current law to 
clarify the roles and responsibilities of each state agency that would 
be involved in a public health threat posed by mosquitos bearing the 
EEE virus. 
While the DPH is currently responsible for determining whether 
mosquitos bearing EEE pose a threat to the public health,241 there 
are no clear standards for making such a determination. During the 
spring of 1990, the DPH recognized the existence of unusually high 
numbers of mosquitos and the presence ofEEE in certain mosquitos, 
but the department lacked any statutory assistance in deciding when 
the EEE-bearing mosquitos posed a threat that reached "emer-
g.ency" proportions.242 Additionally, while the the EOEA recognized 
its responsibility to address the mosquito threat, officials within the 
EOEA did not seem to have a clear idea of the appropriate means 
of addressing the threat. 243 
The Massachusetts legislature either should draft or should force 
the state agencies to draft explicit criteria to determine appropriate 
actions under the varying circumstances of an EEE threat. For 
instance, if the dangerous combination of large mosquito populations 
and the occurrence of the EEE virus is detected at an early point 
in the spring, the SRMCB should have to conduct ground spraying 
in specific high-risk areas. Additionally, the legislature could require 
the SRMCB to employ a long-term, plan of nonpesticide measures or 
pesticide measures aimed at reducing the chance of exposing the 
general public to toxic pesticides. 
241 See supra notes 52r-54 and accompanying text. 
Z42 See MAss. GEN. L. ro. 17, §§ 1-7A (1981 & Supp. 1990). 
248 See Letter from Mark Buffone, supra note lOB, at 1. 
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The legislature also may wish to amend the commonwealth's pes-
ticide laws to allow aerial pesticide spraying only after agencies have 
exhausted means that are less damaging both to the public health 
and the environment. Short of amending the manner in which the 
commonwealth may apply pesticides, the legislature should force the 
SRMCB to adhere to MEPA. To comply with MEPA, the SRMCB 
should evaluate carefully all of the effects of the aerial spraying of 
pesticides, such as malathion, when it devises future solutions to the 
public health threat posed by pests. 
The legislature should amend MEPA to require that state agencies 
file an ENF, and subsequently an EIR, for all actions that arguably 
may have an adverse affect on the environment. Moreover, the 
EOEA secretary should not have the sole discretion regarding 
whether such action has an effect on the environment, particularly 
when the secretary is involved in implementing the agency action. 
Instead, MEPA should be amended to allow interested citizens to 
trigger the review process. Additionally, courts should be able to 
review decisions that MEPA does not apply to a certain activity. 
VIII. CALIFORNIA'S MALATHION PROGRAM 
A. Violation of State Law 
Unlike in Massachusetts, the state agency charged with pest erad-
ication in California did not suffer from statutory ambiguity in the 
exercise of its authority. The California Code explicitly gives the 
director of the CDFA the authority to conduct pest eradication 
measures through the application of registered pesticides.244 The 
only conceivable restriction on the CDFA is the requirement that it 
use nonpesticide measures to the maximum extent feasible. 245 Given 
the deference that California courts traditionally have granted to 
state pest eradication programs,246 however, it seems unlikely that 
a court would have found nonpesticide measures a feasible alterna-
tive to an aerial pesticide program during the 1990 medfly eradication 
campaign. 
As far as public notice is concerned, the California Code merely 
requires that the CDF A give individual notice to landowners in 
urban areas. 247 For nonurban landowners, the code only requires 
244 CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE § 5054 (West 1990). 
246 See id. § 5051. 
246 See supra notes 177-206 and accompanying text. 
247 See CAL. FOOD & AGRIC. CODE §§ 5771-5780 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
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notice through a newspaper of general circulation.248 Additionally, 
the state legislature has exempted programs such as CDF A aerial 
spraying programs from California's primary environmental regu-
lation law, CEQA.249 Therefore, an environmental review of the 
effects of the state's aerial spraying program on the public health 
and the environment was not required by law.250 Moreover, because 
the state conducted the entire operation pursuant to a declaration 
of emergency by the governor of California, the CDF A was acting 
pursuant to all police power vested in the state. 251 
B. Amending California Law 
Although California's aerial pesticide program adhered to the let-
ter of the law, it is obvious that after the seven previous campaigns 
waged against the medfly during the 1980s, the state's current course 
of action will not cure the long-term problem that an infestation of 
medflies in southern California presents. Such a long history of 
infestations causes one to wonder whether the medfly is now firmly 
established in southern California. Instead of repeatedly responding 
to "infestations" of medflies with a short-term band-aid remedy that 
causes tremendous damage to southern California's natural ecosys-
tem by killing "good bugs", the state legislature should consider 
forcing the CDFA to develop long-range plans to address the threat 
to California's agricultural industry. The CDF A also should present 
any long-range measures designed to eradicate the medflies to the 
public and to experts from outside the CDF A for approval. Since 
the CDF A's primary responsibility is the protection of California's 
agriculture industry, it would be wise to have public health officials 
review eradication measures that might affect the health of the 
general pUblic. 
Additionally, one must question the propriety and legality of the 
governor's ability to deem the presence of medflies in southern Cal-
ifornia a "calamity" and thus invoke the Emergency Services Act252-
particularly when such a declaration exempts pest eradication pro-
grams from CEQA regulations that would require an analysis of the 
full effects of the spraying program on the public and the environ-
lM8 ld. § 5051, amended by 1987 Cal. Legis. Servo ch. 1284, § 2 (West) . 
. 249 See CAL. PUB. RES. CODE § 21080.5 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
260 See id. 
261 See CAL GoV'T. CODE § 8627 (West 1980 & Supp. 1991). 
262 CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 14, § 15359 (1986). 
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ment.253 By allowing the governor to address a long-term problem 
by simply labeling it an "emergency", the California legislature is 
ignoring its responsibility to make laws regarding pest eradication. 
Finally, the state legislature should not allow pest eradication 
programs in general to be exempt from the categories of projects 
for which state agencies must file EIRs under CEQA. The entire 
purpose of CEQA is to inform the public of the potential damage to 
the environment that state projects may cause.254 The mere incon-
venience of compliance with the CEQA requirements should not be 
sufficient reason to allow the state to neglect an analysis of the effects 
of an aerial spraying program on the public and the environment. In 
fact, the magnitude of the state's efforts in 1990 and the negative 
response to the program from the general public suggests that it is 
imperative the state provide its citizens with the best information 
possible on the impact of continuous application of malathion on 
southern California. 
IX. CONCLUSION 
Current law in Massachusetts and California makes it too easy for 
those states to expose the public and the natural environment to the 
potential dangers from toxic pesticides, particularly when the human 
health effects are suspect and the environmental effects are signifi-
cant. Because it does not seem likely that state courts will strike 
down state aerial pesticide programs as violating any constitutional 
right, Massachusetts and California legislators should amend their 
states' law to provide greater protection to human health and the 
environment. In Massachusetts, legislators should amend state law 
to clarify and coordinate the roles of the different state agencies in 
conducting pest eradication programs. Additionally, legislatures in 
both states should set out strict criteria not only for identifying 
potential threats from pests, but also for mandating incremental 
remedial measures that pose the least threat to the public health 
and the environment. These measures should include nonpesticide 
alternatives. Finally, state agencies should place greater emphasis 
on input from the public and outside public health experts. The 
government should not usurp that input, as has been the case of 
California, by declarations of emergencies when true emergencies 
do not exist. 
263 CAL. PuB. RES. CODE § 21080.5 {West 1986 & Supp. 1991). 
264 See id. § 21000. 
